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This article theorises the relationship of crisis and political secrecy in European public policy. 
Combining the literatures on crisis management and securitisation, it introduces two distinct types of 
crisis-related secrecy. (1) Reactive secrecy denotes the deliberate concealment of information from 
the public with the aim of reducing immediate negative crisis consequences. It presents itself as a 
functional necessity of crisis management. (2) Active secrecy is about substantive or procedural 
secrecy employed by authority-holders to implement their interests with fewer restraints. Here, secrecy 
is an instrument of crisis exploitation, reducing obstacles to extraordinary measures. This distinction is 
based on an understanding of authority-holders as simultaneous legitimacy- and discretion-seekers 
whose secrecy politics depend on the constraints and opportunities presented by crises. In order to 
illustrate active and reactive secrecy, the article uses examples from the euro crisis (Eurogroup 
summitry, ECB sovereign bond purchases) and the security crisis after 9/11 (terror lists). 
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Moments of crisis are typically seen as the high times of political secrecy. 
Irrespective of their theoretical orientation, scholars perceive a general tendency for 
political crises to coincide with secretive political practices or at least a decline in 
transparency. The public policy literature on crisis management often treats political 
secrets as a functional element of crisis communication (Boin et al. 2005: 69–90; 
Guttieri et al. 1995). Scholarship in critical security studies, on the other hand, 
generally tends to cast crises and publicity as being in a zero-sum relationship: ‘The 
presumption holds that the more governments emphasise security … the more 
degraded and eviscerated becomes the quality of public life in liberal democracies’ 
(Walters 2015: 287; see Barnett 2015). According to Williams (2003: 524), issues 
that are successfully framed as an existential threat to a political community are 
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As the European Union concludes its first decade of interrelated and partially 
overlapping crises, a link between crisis and secrecy also seems to be confirmed 
empirically in this post-national setting. At least, observers are increasingly 
concerned with lowering transparency levels in governance areas affected by the 
crises (e.g. Curtin 2017; Schmidt forthcoming). In fact, precisely the most 
consequential acts of authority carried out as a crisis response were often 
accompanied by opaque procedures, backdoor bargaining, or temporarily withheld 
information. 
 
However, we know hardly anything about why exactly this is the case and what we 
should make of it. There is a pronounced theoretical shortage to account for crisis-
induced political secrecy. Why and how do crises prompt political secrecy? What 
motivates political actors to resort to what kind of secretive behaviour in the context 
of crisis? Not only are answers to these questions necessary to explain political 
secrecy in the context of crisis, they also have important consequences for how to 
interpret and evaluate the procedural legitimacy of (European) crisis governance. 
The ambition of this article is to provide a typological theorisation of different 
varieties of political secrecy as they occur in crises. While the arguments are 
developed with a view to the actors and institutions of the EU, the theoretical 
contribution is potentially applicable to all domestic or international political orders 
marked by authority relationships and not by (despotic) power. 
 
To theorise the varieties of political secrecy in European crises, I integrate the 
usually distinct studies of crisis management on the one hand and crisis politics on 
the other (see ‘t Hart and Sundelius 2013: 446–9). The former strand of research 
has a technical-managerial perspective on crises and usually focuses on their 
constraining effects on decision-making processes and political choice for other-
regarding policy-makers (e.g. Boin 2004). By contrast, the latter has a strategic-
political perspective on crises and understands them mostly as opportunities 
constructed and exploited by self-interested policy-makers to implement 
extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998; McDonald 2008). While these 
approaches seem to rely on incompatible actor-theoretic assumptions, I argue that 
they are two sides of the same coin. Based on the recent literature on 
(international) authority (e.g. Zürn 2017), European-level authority-holders should 
be understood as simultaneously seeking discretionary control over policy and 
legitimation by relevant audiences. In the context of crises, these endogenous 
preferences provide incentives to both manage and exploit the moments of turmoil 
which I conceive as two separate yet potentially overlapping types of actor 
strategies in times of crisis. 
 
The reasons for resorting to political secrecy and its specific manifestation in crises 
are directly related to these underlying assumptions. I argue that the two basic 
crisis strategies go along with two distinct types of crisis-induced political secrecy in 
Europe: reactive secrecy as part of crisis management and active secrecy as part 
of crisis exploitation. Reactive secrecy denotes the deliberate 
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concealment of information from the public with the aim of reducing immediate 
negative crisis consequences. Importantly, a defining feature of reactive secrecy is 
that authority-holders have little or nothing to gain from secrecy in terms of political 
discretion. They resort to secrecy because they deem it functionally necessary for 
coping with the crisis. Crisis conditions thus function as constraints on the menu of 
choice for policy-makers. By contrast, active secrecy is about substantive or 
procedural secrecy employed by authority-holders to implement their interests with 
fewer restraints. Here, decision-makers are not (merely) functionally pushed into 
secrecy by the crisis conditions. On the contrary, active secrecy is characterised by 
the fact that authority-holders have a lot to gain from secrecy as it allows them to 
reduce the justification requirements and audience costs for contentious measures. 
Such secret activities become possible because the impression of threat and 
urgency lowers the public’s demands for input legitimacy (see Krebs 2009). Crisis 
conditions thus open up ‘secrecy opportunities’ to decision-makers. 
 
In order to develop this argument, the first part of the paper lays down some 
theoretical foundations for crisis politics in the EU. It starts by theorising the 
motivations and incentives of European-level authority-holders, before 
conceptualizing the core elements of crisis and discussing their constraining and 
enabling effects on policy-making. Building on these micro-foundations, the second 
part of the paper introduces reactive and active secrecy as analytically distinct 
types of crisis-induced secrecy relating to the strategies of crisis management and 
crisis exploitation, respectively. As a ‘proof of concept’, the paper provides empirical 
evidence to support and illustrate the basic existence statements regarding these 
types. I illustrate the dynamics of reactive secrecy with the example of secret 
deliberations in Eurogroup summitry during the euro crisis. To portray forms of 
active secrecy, I present firstly the case of the EU’s terrorism blacklists introduced 
after 9/11 and secondly the assumption by the European Central Bank (ECB) of the 
role of a lender of last resort to countries in the Eurozone. In the conclusion, I point 
to questions for further research. 
 
Wielding authority in times of crisis 
 
In order to provide the baseline for theorising the concrete effects of crisis on 
political secrecy in Europe, this section starts by specifying some actor and action 
theoretic assumptions regarding the motivations and constraints of EU-level 
authority-holders under conditions of political stress. In a second step, it looks at the 
conceptual building blocks of crisis and discusses the constraints and opportunities 
for authority-holders emanating from these with a view to secrecy.  
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Motivations and opportunity structures for European authority-holders 
 
European-level crisis politics may imply governance activities by a variety of 
different (executive) actors ranging from member state governments and the 
Council via the Commission to relevant executive agencies. These institutions 
certainly function according to partially diverging logics of action and are not 
normally considered like-minded in the general processes of European integration 
and day-to-day legislation (e.g. Hartlapp et al. 2014; Rittberger and Wonka 2011; 
Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). However, in the context of crisis politics and for present 
purposes, it is important to highlight that, at a very basic level, these actors share 
the social role of authority-holders, which is defined in opposition to the social role 
of the addressees of authority. As such, these actors have a common set of 
motives and restraints which allow for deriving more general expectations about 
their management and exploitation of crises (see Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2016: 
333). 
 
International authority can be defined as a (collective) actor’s ability to formulate 
prescriptions, rules, and orders that are, in principle, recognised as binding by the 
rule-addressees, even though they may go against the short-term interests of some 
community members (Zürn et al. 2012: 87).1 Importantly, authority is ‘reflexive’ in 
that it builds on recognition and voluntary subordination which cannot simply be 
enforced as in domestic systems of rule backed by the monopoly on the use of 
force. On the contrary, to maintain and perpetuate authority relationships, the 
holders of authority constantly need to be legitimized (Zürn 2017; see also Krisch 
2017). That is, authority-holders always rely on the principled support of those who 
confer the authority. They therefore attempt to nurture beliefs in their legitimacy, 
typically by trying to achieve goals in the public interest and adhering to certain 
procedural standards. This is not to say that authority will always be legitimate or 
that authority-holders may not pursue parochial rather than public interests. Yet 
strongly and permanently illegitimate authority is unlikely to be stable and 
sustainable for it invites non-compliance, shifting, and normative backlash (Heupel 
2013; Heupel and Zürn 2017). Hence, we should assume an endogenous 
preference for authority-holders to be legitimacy-seekers and thus to work in the 
public interest. 
 
At the same time, however, European authority-holders, be they political leaders or 
technocratic decision-makers, must also be seen as strategic actors whose 
broadest motivation is to realise their self- or other-regarding interests in the way 
they deem appropriate (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2016: 333). Other than 
authority-addressees who have a lot to gain from legally and politically constraining 
the reach and intrusiveness of executive authorities to protect their rights and 
freedom, authority-holders have a lot to gain from discretionary authority as it 
enables them more freely to implement their preferences. All other things being 
equal, decision-makers look for the path of least resistance to implement their 
interests and thus favour discretion and institutional flexibility 
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over rigid constraints and controls. They therefore seek discretionary control over 
policy. 
 
Assuming that decision-makers in the EU thus have the endogenous preferences to 
(a) implement their interests as they see fit and (b) be perceived as legitimate in 
doing so, we can derive two broad expectations about the behavior of authority-
holders in times of crisis. First, as Boin et al. (2005: 70) highlight, crisis governors 
depend on a ‘permissive consensus’ in their relevant audience to effectuate their 
policies without jeopardising their authority. In moments of acute crisis, this means 
that authority-holders need to make sure they appear to be effective problem-
solvers in line with public expectations. Generally speaking, authority-holders 
therefore have an incentive to manage and fight crises in the interests of their 
respective publics to the best of their abilities. At least as important, however, crisis 
decision-makers need to stay on top of the information flow to get across an 
understanding of the causes and consequences of the crisis, in the light of which 
their actions appear reasonable. In that sense, crisis communication is absolutely 
crucial: ‘Effective crisis leadership cannot be brought about by simply “doing the 
right thing” on the ground; it also presupposes a sure-footed manipulation of 
symbols that shape the views and sentiments of the political environment in ways 
that enhance leadership capacity to act’ (Boin et al. 2005: 70). 
 
Second, as discretion-seekers, authority-holders not only depend on permissive 
audiences, they also depend on permissive legal and institutional structures which 
do not hamper their ambitions to progress swiftly with their political programme. 
Whether or not they amount to ‘critical junctures’, which offset trodden institutional 
paths (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007), crises typically do imply a broader than usual 
menu of feasible policy options for authority-holders. As the securitisation literature 
has theorised and documented, the successful framing of an issue as a critical 
threat to a referent community opens the way for policy-makers to employ 
extraordinary means to cope with the situation, because the sense of crisis induces 
public deference to claims of political necessity (Buzan et al. 1998: 24; Hanrieder 
and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). Authority-holders can thus be expected to exploit 
moments of fear and disorder to test hitherto barred institutional routes, take 
unprecedented steps, and test new legal waters. In extremis, this may amount to 
‘emergency politics’ in which authority-holders assert crisis measures which deviate 
from established (constitutional) norms and procedures, justified as necessary to 
cope with the existential threat that makes up the crisis (Kreuder-Sonnen 2016; 
White 2015). 
 
Considering authority-holders’ general predispositions and the typical political 
opportunity structures created by crises, we thus arrive at two broad patterns of 
likely behaviour that could be juxtaposed as ‘crisis management’ and ‘crisis 
exploitation’ (see also Boin et al. 2009). While these are closely linked and certainly 
often intertwined empirically, their distinction highlights the somewhat paradoxical 
nature of crisis as simultaneous constraint and opportunity 
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for authority-holders. In the following, I shall specify in some more detail the basic 
characteristics of crises and how they constrain or enable policy-makers. 
 
Crisis as constraint and opportunity 
 
There is an abundance of different understandings and conceptualisations of crisis 
in the literature (see Koselleck 2006). The lowest common denominator of 
academic discourse on crisis seems to be the agreement that it marks a potentially 
disruptive phase in the – sociologically speaking – normal evolution of a system. In 
the crisis management literature, a definition dominates which implies ‘a serious 
threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, 
which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making 
vital decisions’ (Rosenthal et al. 1989: 10). While appearing as an objectivist notion 
of crisis marked by exogenously given facts, scholarship on crisis management has 
also come to stress the importance of intersubjective perception (Blumann and 
Picod 2010: 6): In the face of the greatest danger to the existence of a given 
community, no crisis will occur if the threat is not known or does not seem credible. 
Conversely, in the absence of any ‘real’ danger, a crisis may nonetheless unfold if a 
relevant audience believes or is made to believe in the existence of an imminent 
threat. This approach creates an area of overlap with the constructivist 
understanding of crisis dominant in the literature on crisis politics, most notably in 
securitisation theory. It builds on the assumption that existential threats are 
discursively constructed. There are thus no essential security or non-security 
issues, only securitised and non-securitised issues (see Buzan et al. 1998; Waever 
1995). In both accounts, perception is a necessary condition for crises. The 
prominence of perception, in turn, underlines the potential for framing contests and 
discursive struggles over the interpretation of a given social reality (Boin et al. 
2009). 
 
For the purpose of this paper, a crisis is hence understood as a broad-based 
intersubjective perception of threat, urgency, and uncertainty – irrespective of 
whether these elements are measurable against some external standard or are 
mere constructions of the mind (see also Billings et al. 1980; Boin 2004; Boin and 
Rhinard 2008). The three dimensions of crisis ‒ the perceived threat, the perceived 
urgency, and the perceived uncertainty ‒ impose constraints and create 
opportunities for discretion and legitimacy-seeking authority-holders.  
 
The element of threat imposes obvious constraints on authority-holders but 
simultaneously opens up political opportunities. In terms of constraints, legitimacy-
seeking authority-holders confront a fearful public which expects solutions. 
Decision-makers are thus under pressure to manage perceptions, expectations, 
and the problem itself. Doing nothing is not an option. In terms of opportunities, by 
contrast, the common perception of a serious threat tends to shift legitimacy 
requirements from the input to the output dimension: people are less concerned 
with procedural standards than with the effectiveness of 
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policies (e.g. Krebs 2009). This allows authority-holders to exercise discretion (in 
good or bad faith) and adopt particularly intrusive or far-reaching measures which 
would otherwise have been impossible or at least more difficult to attain. 
 
Crises also involve a sense of urgency in confronting the respective threat. Serious, 
even credible threats, as dangerous and life-threatening as they may be, will not 
induce a widespread sense of crisis if the underlying problem does not exhibit 
immediate and tangible consequences. Climate change (and the futile attempt at its 
securitisation) provides an example of this. As Boin et al. (2005: 3) put it, ‘most 
policy-makers do not lose sleep over problems with a horizon that exceeds their 
political life expectancy. Time compression is a defining element of crisis: the threat 
is here, it is real, and it must be dealt with as soon as possible (at least that’s the 
way it is perceived)’. On the one hand, urgency has the consequence that decision-
makers at the operational level have to take vital decisions under enormous time 
pressure. On the other hand, urgency tremendously increases the issue salience 
and public sensitivity to political communication by the policy-makers in charge. For 
the legitimacy-seeker, this means severe restrictions on the capacity for proactive 
and informed policy-making, imposing prudent communication strategies and 
conscious choices of timing. However, for the discretion-seeker, urgency may be 
good news. For periods of heightened time pressure often require and justify the 
suspension or circumvention of ordinary decision-making procedures in order to 
fast-track important crisis measures. This crisis mode typically reduces 
transparency, undermines the quality of public debate, and thus facilitates the swift 
implementation of measures that would otherwise not – or at least less easily – 
have been possible. 
 
Finally, crises are typically characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. If policy-
makers knew exactly what the nature, causes, and consequences of the threat 
were, they could specify and target their solutions accordingly and would be able to 
prevent the problem from deteriorating into a full-blown crisis. Yet it is precisely a 
lack of this knowledge which renders crisis management a particularly difficult task. 
Often, uncertainty pertains to both the underlying problem (What exactly is going 
on? Why does it happen? What will happen next?) and, partly as a consequence, 
the effects of the political response (What are the policy options? What will be the 
consequences and opportunity costs of selecting one option over the other?) 
(Billings et al. 1980). On the one hand, this arguably puts crisis managers in an 
‘impossible condition’ (Boin et al. 2005: 4) as they have to make urgent decisions 
and coordinate vital response operations while being in the dark about essential 
questions regarding the causes and consequences of the problematic situation they 
find themselves in. Moreover, the shortage of confirmed information provides space 
for the spread of public rumours and misinformation which put further stress on 
authority-holders. In order to avoid the spiralling out of control of crisis perception 
and the corresponding expectations towards policy-makers, crisis management 
also has to encompass rumour and media management (Boin et al. 2014: 311). On 
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the other hand, uncertainty and problem complexity also present some room for 
manoeuvre for discretion-seekers to exploit. As policy effects become more difficult 
to pin down and responsibilities difficult to attribute, necessity and success of crisis 
measures may turn into questions of representation and interpretation rather than 
measurement. This again increases the spectrum of possibilities for authority-
holders. 
 
In sum, we should expect European authority-holders to be simultaneously 
legitimacy- and discretion-seeking actors who will both have to manage and try to 
exploit crisis situations. Crises exhibit fundamental characteristics such as broad 
perceptions of threat, urgency, and uncertainty, which all impose a number of 
constraints and necessities on crisis managers but also provide opportunities for 
crisis exploiters. In the next section, I go on to show how these patterns translate 
into different types and logics of crisis-induced secrecy in Europe. 
 
Crisis-induced secrecy in Europe 
 
In the following, I will lay out two basic logics of crisis-induced political secrecy in 
Europe – active and reactive – and specify the kind and depth of secrecy employed 
in each type. I start with reactive secrecy as a crisis management tactic and 
illustrate my arguments with the example of secrecy in Eurogroup summitry during 
the euro crisis. In a second step, I present active secrecy as a means of crisis 
exploitation which goes along with a move to emergency politics. I identify two sub-
types of active secrecy: secrecy as an extraordinary measure to reach a crisis-
related political goal (direct); and the diversion of regular secrecy as a consequence 
of emergency empowerment (indirect). The former is illustrated with the case of 
opacity in EU terrorism blacklisting after 9/11, the latter with the case of the ECB’s 




Theorising reactive secrecy 
 
Reactive secrecy describes the deliberate concealment of information from the 
public, based on a political decision which seems necessary to authority-holders for 
functional reasons of problem-solving. It is ‘reactive’ because authority-holders 
have no ulterior motive for secrecy other than limiting the crisis impact. In particular, 
this pertains to situations in which decision-makers even have incentives to open up 
to the public because they could score points with their domestic audience for being 
ardent problem-solvers or negotiating in their favour. We thus talk about secretive 
behaviour that is not self-interested per se. Instead, it forms part of the acute 
phases of crisis management that incite 
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crisis communication, which implies a strategic distribution of information. Here, 
resorting to secrecy can have three distinct goals: 
 
(1) Control the public threat perception. Probably the most common reason for 
concealing information from the public in crisis situations is to avoid panic. 
Crisis managers have the primary responsibility to defend given 
communities against a threat and this task may be facilitated if those who 
are to be protected do not have unrestrained access to the information 
decision-makers have. In an extreme case, full access might result in actual 
panic and thus chaos and disorder (think of bank runs, lootings, traffic 
breakdown, etc.). Such developments represent second-order crises which 
must also be dealt with and thus draw attention and resources away from 
confronting the initial crisis. Of course, the point is not to withhold vital 
information from community members who are thus actually put in harm’s 
way, only to deflect attention from the problem. While this might arise as a 
problem of miscalculation and policy failure, the assumption here is that 
crisis managers intend to protect their authority-addressees. 
 
(2) Avoid further deterioration of the problematic situation through unfiltered or 
wrongly timed information. High levels of urgency and uncertainty may 
require the confidentiality of decision-making to prevent strategic 
alternatives or weaknesses from being aired (e.g. in a security crisis 
scenario). Especially regarding man-made risks and crises such as 
terrorism or financial crises, where the actions of individuals are decisive for 
the aggravation or containment of the threat (see Beck 2009), the 
concealment of information may seem necessary in order to leave 
adversaries in the dark or avoid detrimental collective reactions to potential 
decisions. Moreover, given the importance of timing in crisis communication, 
it can be imperative for creating or avoiding given policy effects to keep 
decisions secret until certain external conditions are met. 
 
(3)  Facilitate goal-oriented, not audience-oriented deliberations. Confidentiality 
of crisis decision-making may have the crucial advantage of allowing 
authority-holders to have ‘open negotiations’ without being held to account 
for everything they say by their respective audience, which can only 
evaluate the overall negotiation outcome. In that way, they avoid audience 
costs, e.g. for revealing otherwise unpleasant truths (such as the true extent 
of problems, risks, damage), which may be necessary to devise adequate 
measures to cope with the crisis. Moreover, in the context of interstate crisis 
diplomacy, Kurizaki (2007: 543) points out that secrecy may enhance the 
prospect of peaceful outcomes because it ‘insulates leaders from domestic 
political consequences when they capitulate to a challenge to avoid 
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risking unwarranted war’. In other words, negotiators’ win-sets increase 
because they are less credibly committed to certain outcomes (Fearon 
1997). In particular, they do not have to fear (full-blown) political punishment 
for negotiation failure and may thus more easily acquiesce in individually 
sub-optimal but collectively beneficial solutions. While the audience cost 
literature is about the interactions of state leaders and their domestic 
audiences, the basic rationale also applies to supranational crisis response 
agencies’ confidentiality vis-à-vis their environment. 
 
As a consequence of these goals, reactive secrecy will typically be mostly about the 
secrecy of deliberations, not of material decisions. In the context of crisis 
communication, the presentation and ‘selling’ of decisions as effective and 
sustainable remedies against the looming threat is of paramount importance. 
Authority-holders thus have little incentive to keep their solutions secret, except on 
a temporary basis for reasons of timing, as discussed above. Indeed, there may be 
confidential deliberations which deal with classified information that remains under 
wraps on a longer-term basis. Yet the crisis decision to which the deliberations 
gave rise will be communicated. 
 
Reactive secrecy is not a fully operationalisable concept because it is defined by 
eventually unobservable actor motivations (as is active secrecy, see below). 
However, we can specify at least two observable implications which should 
increase confidence in the finding of reactive, not active secrecy. First, we should 
not see any major benefits that crisis managers can reap from secrecy in terms of 
executive discretion. The question is: did authority-holders achieve political goals 
through secretive practices which they would not otherwise have been able to 
achieve for reasons of institutional or popular constraints? If not, it is likely that their 
intention was not exploitation but management. Second, and related, in reactive 
secrecy, actors might forgo opportunities for political advantage by being secretive. 
If they actually have an incentive to carry out their practices in public, keeping the 
secret is detrimental to their political self-interest which is thus unlikely to be driving 
their behaviour. We can then conclude that secrecy is a crisis reaction which 
legitimacy-seeking authority-holders deem necessary.2 
 
Illustrating reactive secrecy: summitry during the euro crisis 
 
What is now commonly referred to as the euro crisis, i.e. the period of Eurozone 
members’ near sovereign defaults, waning inter-bank lending, and broad economic 
downturn starting in late 2009, is a textbook example of the combination of threat, 
urgency, and uncertainty. The perceived threat was that unsustainable sovereign 
debt levels would make financial markets lose confidence in the integrity of the euro 
and thus endanger the survival of the common currency as a whole. A perception of 
urgency was created by very technical deadlines, such as sovereign bond maturity 
dates, and time pressure created by expected 
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market reactions to inaction. Finally, there was a high level of perceived uncertainty 
regarding both the underlying problem and the consequences of potential 
responses. Was the crisis a consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis? Was it 
a banking crisis? Or was it a sovereign debt crisis prompted by the profligate 
spending of some member states? And how would ‘the markets’ react to specific 
measures? How much of a safety net would be sufficient? Could rescue measures 
be counter-productive to solving the underlying problem? And so forth.3 
 
In procedural terms, European-level authority-holders responded with a high level 
of secrecy in their deliberations, which they deemed vital to manage the public 
threat perception and to avoid a further deterioration of the situation. This partial 
concealment of information from the public was reactive, because it followed from 
the constraints imposed by crisis conditions and fulfilled a clear crisis-management 
function.4 Importantly, authority-holders hardly gained additional political power by 
operating confidentially. To the contrary, it seems that they could actually have 
profited from publicity. This at least is suggested by remarks of the then Eurogroup 
president, Jean-Claude Juncker, who in 2011 admonished the, in his view, 
insufficient secrecy of some European leaders, seeing the problem in the fact that 
‘each of us wants to show his domestic public that he’s the greatest guy under the 
sky’.5 
 
Juncker’s concerns notwithstanding, the European crisis management was in fact 
marked by a strategic concealment or merely partial release of information – 
particularly during the early phase of the euro crisis. As revealed by an investigative 
report for the Wall Street Journal in September 2010, the first Greek bailout in April 
of that year had been preceded by months of negotiations behind the scenes, which 
were initially completely concealed from the European public.6 After the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008, European leaders had set up a secret task 
force to prepare contingency plans in case of a crisis spill-over to the Eurozone. 
This ‘group that doesn’t exist’7 was made up of high-ranking government officials 
from France and Germany as well as representatives of the Commission, the ECB, 
and the office of the Eurogroup president. It was only in February 2010 that the 
committee opened its doors to the other Eurozone members (except Greece). 
Starting in late 2009, when the Greek Socialist government for the first time 
announced the country’s true budget deficit, the secret task force met in the context 
of Council meetings and EU summits, at 6 am or late at night, to discuss ways to 
prevent countries in the euro area from defaulting. 
 
Most importantly, secrecy was perceived to be necessary for the sake of impression 
management: decision-makers feared that the serious information they were 
dealing with, i.e. the eventuality of a Greek default, would lead bond traders to 
assume the country’s imminent insolvency and thus cause panic among market 
participants. Hence, members of the secret task force even ‘kept colleagues in their 
own governments in the dark, for fear leaks would trigger rampant speculations in 
financial markets’.8 Up until February 2010, Greece 
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was never an official topic at Council meetings and the key players in the group 
publicly insisted that the country’s fiscal situation was not on the agenda, even 
though more and more information on a potential bailout was leaked to the media.9 
Towards the end, when the first rescue package was finally hammered out, the 
crisis managers apparently cherished the hope that as long as they did not upset 
the markets by openly addressing the issue, Greece might be able to buy its way 
out of the trouble on its own. Secrecy was thus a means of managing the threat 
perception which stood in direct relationship to the magnitude of the crisis and was 
therefore deemed essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. 
 
In the course of the crisis, this initial level of secrecy could not be upheld. Too much 
public attention was given to the emergency summits which had to be convened in 
ever shorter time periods, and rising expectations for definite solutions to the crisis 
rendered it impossible (and illogical) for authority-holders to deny that they were 
actually talking about the problem. Still, the summits preserved firm ‘islands of 
secrecy’ in the sense that, while it was clear who was negotiating with whom where 
and when on what issue, the substance of deliberations was kept under wraps and 
only meticulously timed pieces of information on the outcome were communicated 
to the public. One good example is the 26 October 2011 extraordinary euro summit, 
where European state and institution leaders met at the brink of another Eurozone 
meltdown and disappeared behind closed doors for more than 12 hours. It was only 
at 4 o’clock in the morning of the following day, just in time for the opening of the 
Asian stock markets, that the Commission and Council presidents went to the press 
to announce the leveraging of the European Financial Stability Facility into a new 
‘bazooka’ supposed to calm the markets.10 In a public appearance a few months 
earlier, Jean-Claude Juncker openly stated that he was ‘for secret, dark debates’ 
and explained:  
 
Actions on the financial markets are taking place in real time. We don’t always agree at each 
and every debate on monetary policy, but meanwhile markets are reacting. […] If we indicate 
possible decisions, we are fuelling speculations on the financial markets and we are throwing in 




The secrecy of summit deliberations throughout the euro crisis is thus well 
characterised as a reaction to functional requirements of crisis management. Also 
in this later period, the overwhelming secrecy objective was the prevention of a 
further deterioration of the situation through consequences of unfiltered and wrongly 
timed information. Moreover, it seems that a high degree of confidentiality at the 
meetings was a precondition for authority-holders, under close scrutiny from their 
domestic audiences, to reach agreements under pressure of time.
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Active secrecy 
 
Theorising active secrecy 
 
Active secrecy denotes the deliberate concealment of information from the public in 
order to reach political goals that would otherwise be (more) difficult to realise. It is 
about situations in which authority-holders have nothing to gain from transparency, 
because it would merely raise justification requirements, incite critical questions, or 
even bar the implementation of specific policies due to legal or democratic 
resistance. While active secrecy may, in principle, be employed by authority-holders 
at all times, crises are particularly prone to the emergence of active secrecy. For 
the context of crisis provides ‘secrecy opportunities’ to decision-makers as the 
public tends to accept lower procedural standards if a threat is successfully framed 
as existential and requiring extraordinary measures in order for it to be contained 
(see Buzan et al. 1998). 
 
In the most drastic scenario, secrecy may be employed to facilitate policies which, 
due to their legal or political implications, could hardly be realised publicly. Take the 
United States’ secret surveillance programme after 9/11 which has only recently 
been uncovered. Here, the emergency measure, justified internally and – ex post – 
publicly as necessary to counter the threat of terrorism, was itself kept secret. The 
only conceivable reason for this decision was the anticipation that the extremely far-
reaching surveillance programme would not have met with unanimous approval 
from the public, which could have hampered the programme’s realisation or 
efficacy. However, this form of ‘deep’ active secrecy (Scheppele 1988), by which 
authority-holders direct secret operations at the fringes of the law, does not seem to 
be easily realisable outside sovereign states. For it appears to be premised on the 
existence of a centralised security apparatus and a monopoly on its use. Given EU 
member states’ broad retention of sovereignty in this area, it is rather unlikely to 
feature in European crisis politics. 
 
At the European level, active secrecy can be expected to be about the reasons, 
backgrounds, or evidence for emergency measures and decisions. Authority-
holders use the crisis conditions to present their policies as necessary to deal with 
the threat the community is facing and thus eschew the normally required standards 
of evidentiary reasoning to make the case for a certain measure and its application. 
Due to the emergency rationale, the public accepts claims rather than disclosed 
facts as a basis to approve of political action. Take the example of the run-up to the 
2003 Iraq war: under the impression of an imminent new wave of transnational 
terrorism and the Anthrax panic which fuelled fears of a threat of biological 
weapons, the Bush administration claimed that the Iraqi government was 
harbouring terrorists and possessed weapons of mass destruction. It did not 
provide evidence for the allegations because they were putatively based on secret 
intelligence (Kull et al. 2003–2004). Public opinion in the United States nevertheless 
sided with the government and accepted the war was necessary. 
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This form of active secrecy can have two variants, one direct and one more indirect. 
In the first type, secrecy is itself part of the extraordinariness of emergency politics. 
That is, by way of increased secrecy, a common and normal practice is extended in 
terms of reach and intrusiveness. For instance, wiretapping or police raids are 
common and normal practices of law-enforcement which usually require the 
authorisation of a judge based on evidence for exigent circumstances. Yet when 
authority-holders in an apparent emergency suspend the legal process of 
authorisation or classify the evidence, e.g. for reasons of national security, the 
constraints on the use of wiretapping and raids are removed. For the non-disclosure 
of incriminating evidence consumes the basis for any kind of external review. As a 
consequence, the practices can de facto be carried out against anyone at any time. 
Moreover, the rule-addressees lose potential legal remedies to appeal against the 
measures because they cannot counter the evidence held against them. 
 
Whereas the first type is thus characterised by normal practice and extraordinary 
secrecy, the second type is characterised by extraordinary practice and normal 
secrecy: it is about extended secrecy as an implication of extraordinary measures. 
That is, by way of emergency politics – i.e. practices exceeding the limits of the 
normal constraints on authority – the reach of ‘normal’ secrecy is expanded beyond 
its intended scope and purpose. This type of active secrecy pertains to authority-
holders such as non-majoritarian institutions whose default operating mode is 
confidential. Since the general tasks of courts, central banks, or independent 
regulatory agencies are decidedly non-political and, presumably, collectively 
welfare-enhancing, shielding these institutions from public debate and scrutiny is 
seen to be an important factor to avoid politicisation of the supposedly technical 
decision-making (Majone 1999). However, emergency politics can turn this logic 
upside down. When a non-majoritarian institution adopts emergency measures – 
either because it is made to by powerful states or out of institutional self-interest – 
that go beyond its narrowly circumscribed mandate and entail distributional 
consequences, its decisions become political (Kreuder-Sonnen 2016). As a 
consequence, the opaque decision-making procedures designed for an institution 
with merely pareto-optimising regulatory tasks are being diverted to a political 
realm. ‘Normal’ secrecy thus becomes extraordinary secrecy through crisis 
exploitation. Indeed, while this type is more indirect than the first, it is still active 
secrecy, not reactive. Authority-holders know what they do when they employ a 
seemingly apolitical institution to implement emergency policies. The confidentiality 
of decision-making procedures, which shields the issue from public scrutiny and 
criticism, helps them implement their interests with less resistance. 
 
Whether direct or indirect, active secrecy can thus be observed by uncovering the 
concrete power benefits of secrecy for authority-holders. In contrast to reactive 
secrecy, where the concealment of information from the public does not increase 
their executive discretion beyond normal institutional confines, 
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in active secrecy, authority-holders build on secrecy to circumvent those very 
confines and advance into the realm of discretionary politics. 
 
Direct active secrecy: EU terror lists 
 
In order to illustrate active secrecy in Europe, I start by describing a case of direct 
active secrecy: the EU’s terrorism blacklist after 9/11. Here, European authority-
holders (Council and Commission) exploited the international security crisis in the 
wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US to devise emergency measures against 
terror suspects based on secret evidence. The case is set in a crisis situation 
marked by a widely perceived threat to the security of Western societies, 
exacerbated by an extremely high degree of uncertainty: after 9/11, the possibility 
of terrorist attacks was a ‘known unknown’ on everyone’s agenda. It was known 
that attacks were planned and would be carried out, but it was unknown when, 
where, and by whom (Daase and Kessler 2007). Building on worst-case scenarios, 
policy-makers operated under a heightened sense of urgency because they had to 
assume that the next attack was imminent. Given the high potential impact of a 
terrorist incident, it would have to be prevented at all costs. This preventive logic 
shaped the global approach to counter-terrorism in the early 2000s (Goede 2008). 
One important counter-terrorism policy deployed in Europe is the blacklisting of 
terror suspects. To comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) 
requiring all states to freeze funds and other financial assets or economic resources 
of persons participating in or supporting terrorist activities, the Council of the EU 
adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 of 
December 2001. They represent the legal basis for the EU’s list of individuals, 
groups, and entities that are subject to ‘targeted’ sanctions, in particular the asset 
freeze. It provides that the Council is in charge of drawing up the list and can 
amend it on a regular basis (Goede 2012). 
 
This process was interspersed with elements of secrecy at three different levels. 
First, beyond the broad contours laid out in the legislation, the Council concealed 
the procedures on how names were added to and removed from the list. As 
Cameron (2003: 234) put it: ‘A lot of the details of the process are shrouded in 
secrecy’. The actual working methods of the body thus could not be known in 
public. Its guidelines were only declassified in 2007, indicating that the Council 
decided on listing and delisting upon member state proposals after secret 
deliberations in its ‘clearing house’ (Heupel 2009). Second, while the Common 
Position indicates that proposals for names should be based on a decision taken by 
a ‘competent authority’ (such as a court) in the designating state, it was left to the 
governments to decide what counts as a competent authority in their domestic 
system. This opened the door to listings based on decisions by national intelligence 
services whose reasons and evidentiary basis for including individuals or entities 
remained secret (Cameron 2003: 235; see also Hoffmann 2008). In effect, the 
information and transparency 
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requirements for listings were extremely low: ‘names and groups were added to the 
list without any examination by the Council (or Commission) of the reasons (none 
having been required or given) of the Member State which proposed the addition’ 
(Guild 2008: 180). Third, and as a consequence, the listed individuals themselves 
remained completely in the dark about the allegations made against them. In the 
first years of the blacklist’s existence, targeted individuals were not even informed 
about the imposition of measures against them, they just found their bank accounts 
frozen. And when they got to know that they were on the list, they would not be 
informed about the reasons for listing. Evidence was marked confidential. This had 
devastating consequences for the availability of legal remedies: judicial review was 
complicated by the fact that listing decisions were made by the Council in the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which normally lies outside 
both the domestic and European courts’ jurisdictions (Guild 2008); what is more, 
‘since listed parties did not have the right to receive a statement of reasons why 
they were listed, it was unclear whether courts would be given sufficient information 
to be able to deliver judgments in the first place’ (Heupel 2009: 317). 
 
To be sure, not every aspect of secrecy in this case necessarily corresponds to the 
conceptualisation of direct active secrecy. For example, the confidentiality of 
deliberations regarding listing decisions can well be considered an instance of 
reactive secrecy where crisis managers had to fear negative security consequences 
from publicly disclosing all information they possessed on all potential suspects.12 
However, most of the elements described are indeed characteristic of active 
secrecy with little discernible problem-solving necessity but employed to extend 
authority-holders’ executive discretion. For the secrecy regarding the evidentiary 
basis for the sanctions turns these otherwise unspectacular acts of public authority 
into de facto unconstrained emergency measures. Building on the public threat 
perception which clearly supported arguments for decisive and pre-emptive policies 
while making procedural concerns take a back seat (Aradau and van Munster 
2007), the EU Council and its member states cultivated a high degree of secrecy 
which allowed them to implement their security interests swiftly without being 
harassed by legal or judicial constraints.  
 
Indirect active secrecy: the ECB’s emergency measures in the euro crisis 
 
The second case of active secrecy illustrates the dynamics of indirect active 
secrecy: the ECB’s assumption of the role of a lender of last resort to countries in 
the Eurozone. Here, European authority holders (the ECB in conjunction with 
powerful member states) exploited the crisis to have the Bank adopt emergency 
policies beyond its constitutional mandate as an independent regulator of monetary 
policy and thus diverted the function of its confidential decision-making procedures. 
The contours of the euro crisis have already been described above. This case 
highlights how the same crisis conditions may function both 
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as constraint, inducing reactive secrecy, and as an opportunity, allowing for active 
secrecy. 
 
The initial design of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reflected 
the view that, in the absence of a real political union, decisions with distributional 
effects in economic and fiscal policy should be taken by parliamentary majorities at 
the national level. Only in the realm of monetary policy, where a pareto-optimising 
welfare effect of common regulation was discernible, was authority delegated to a 
non-majoritarian expert body, namely the ECB (Enderlein 2013: 717–21). By 
default, the Bank’s decision-making takes place behind closed doors. Most 
importantly, the Governing Council minutes, including individual positions and 
voting behaviour, are kept secret. This is supposed to preserve the independence 
of the members of the Governing Council from outside (especially national) 
influence (Curtin 2017). In the classic logic of non-majoritarian institutions, secrecy 
is employed as a means to shield the institution from politicisation. As a counterpart 
to the Bank’s regular secrecy, the ECB’s reach of action was clearly delimited in the 
Treaties. To make sure that it remains within the confines of its delegated authority, 
the ECB’s enumeration of competencies in the Treaties and its Statute ‘gives 
expression to the principle of a strict definition of its mandate’ (Tuori and Tuori 
2014: 30). According to Art. 127 TFEU, the ECB is not only restricted to the realm 
of monetary policy, but has to focus on price stability as its primary objective (para. 
1).  
 
In the course of the euro crisis, however, the Bank’s activities have expanded far 
beyond this narrow field. Not only has the ECB become the central authority in 
banking supervision but, most importantly, it has also assumed the role of a lender 
of last resort (LoLR) to countries in the Eurozone and thus forcefully entered the 
realm of economic policy. First with the adoption of the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) and later through the famous Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) programme, the ECB has empowered itself to buy the sovereign bonds of 
financially distressed member states and thus effectuated fiscal integration ‘through 
the monetary backdoor’ (Schelkle 2014: 106). As a corollary, it got deeply involved 
in detailing, approving, and monitoring austerity reforms in debtor states – as part of 
the Troika but also in its own right. Not only did the ECB try to lock in its resistance 
to debt cuts and restructuring in negotiations over financial assistance through the 
bailout regime, it also used its creditor position to pressure member states to adopt 
fiscal and structural reform as a guarantee for the purchase of bonds (Beukers 
2013). In sum, the Bank’s discretionary power has markedly increased during the 
euro crisis, which arguably rendered it ‘the most central – and powerful – 
supranational institution of our times’ (Curtin 2017; see also Scicluna 2014: 568). 
 
While the ECB’s activities have broadened, its decision-making procedures have 
not become any more transparent. By way of emergency politics, the ‘regular’ 
secrecy for a non-political institution has thus been diverted to genuinely political 
issues. Importantly, it is hard to see in this extension of secrecy 
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a functional necessity for purposes of crisis management. By contrast, it is easy to 
see the advantages secrecy brings for discretion-seeking authority-holders. On the 
one hand, the ECB has obviously increased its institutional power and is now able 
to implement intrusive policies outside usual chains of (public) accountability (see 
also Curtin 2017). On the other hand, the most powerful member states of the 
Eurozone have also benefited from the arrangement, for the ECB’s extraordinary 
measures filled a gap which the EU’s political leaders had left wide open but could 
have closed in principle. Most observers agree that the same effect ECB President 
Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ produced could also have been achieved by introducing 
‘euro bonds’ and/or providing the ESM with a banking licence. However, these 
measures would have required public deliberations and the involvement of national 
parliaments. These would have exposed the highly political nature of the rescue 
operations and policy-makers would have been held to account for their proposals. 
Given the unpopularity of redistribution across Europe, this would have come at a 
high political cost. Instead, leaving the task to the putatively independent ECB 
which adopts seemingly apolitical decisions behind closed doors allowed authority-
holders to reduce the political outcry and shift responsibility. The diversion of 




The aim of this article was to theorise and illustrate the relationship between crisis 
and secrecy in European public policy. Integrating the literature on crisis 
management and crisis politics through the concept of (international) authority, I 
have argued that European authority-holders are simultaneously discretion- and 
legitimacy-seekers who can be expected to either manage or exploit crisis 
situations. Building on these basic actor strategies, I have claimed that crises give 
rise to two types of secrecy, active and reactive, which reflect the crises’ double 
function of political constraint and opportunity. Reactive secrecy denotes the 
intentional concealment of information from the public, deemed necessary for 
functional reasons by crisis managers. Active secrecy, on the other hand, is about 
authority-holders exploiting crisis conditions to justify the concealment of 
information from the public with the aim of implementing policies that would be 
more difficult to realise transparently.  
 
Obviously, this theorisation is tentative and the empirical examples could merely 
illustrate the typology’s plausibility. Further research is needed to develop a full 
theory of crisis-induced secrecy in (European) public policy. Most importantly, it 
would need to specify the conditions under which either active or reactive secrecy 
occurs and say how the two interrelate. Is active and reactive secrecy typically co-
occurring or mutually exclusive? Are there particular crisis attributes or policy field 
characteristics which account for resorting to reactive rather than active secrecy (or 
vice versa)? These and related questions 
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should be addressed in comparative research. The results would certainly also feed 
back into debates about the normative legitimacy of political secrecy in times of 
crisis and potentially provide insights relevant for the question of how best to design 
institutions that allow for effective crisis management but at the same time prevent 




1. For an alternative, more legal definition of international authority, see Hooghe and 
Marks (2015). 
2. To be sure, neither reactive nor active secrecy will necessarily appear in their pure 
form empirically. It is always possible that actors have mixed motives and will 
partially see a need to manage and partially see an opportunity to exploit crises. 
Empirical analyses need to be attentive to the complexities raised by this non-
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research perspectives. For one descriptive but insightful account, see Bastasin 
(2012). For an overview of the origins and impacts of the euro crisis, see the 
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